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ABSTRACT 
ELECTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DURING CIVIL CONFLICT: 
THE CASE OF TURKEY 
EMĠNE ARI 
M.A. Thesis, June 2015 
Supervisor: Assistant Professor Dr. Arzu Kıbrıs 
Keywords: selective violence, indiscriminate violence, Turkey, electoral outcomes 
This thesis aims to study the impact of human rights violations by combatants during a 
civil conflict on election results. During civil conflict, the combatant sides –either state 
or insurgent group- seek to gather support and paralyze the rival by cutting the human 
and logistic support of local people by resorting to violence. These actions of the 
combatants are resulted with serious human rights violations. This thesis is an attempt 
to estimate political outcomes of civilian victimizations by the state and the PKK. Two 
types of, indiscriminate and selective, victimizations are examined separately. During 
the analysis we use multivariate tobit regression to assess the impact of the state and 
PKK civilian victimizations on the government party/parties‟, left and right wing 
parties‟, and pro-Kurdish (HADEP) and ultra-nationalist (MHP) parties‟ vote share. Our 
results suggest that indiscriminate victimization by the state increases voter‟s approval 
rate for the government parties; while the PKK victimization decreases the government 
parties‟ vote share in the following elections. Turkish voters, who are exposed to state 
indiscriminate victimization, vote for the left wing parties those are more concessionist 
to insurgency in order to build peace. HADEP increases its vote share in response to 
indiscriminate victimization by both the state and the PKK.   
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ÖZET 
SEÇĠMLER VE ĠÇ ÇATIġMA SIRASINDA ĠNSAN HAKLARI ĠHLALLERĠ: 
TÜRKĠYE ÖRNEĞĠ 
EMĠNE ARI 
Sosyal Bilimler Yükseklisans Tezi, Haziran 2015 
DanıĢman: Yardımcı Doçent Doktor Arzu Kıbrıs 
Anahtar Sözcükler: seçici şiddet, rastgele şiddet, Türkiye, seçim sonuçları 
Bu tez iç çatıĢma sırasında muharipler tarafından gerçekleĢtirilen insan hakları 
ihlallerinin seçim sonuçları üzerindeki etkisini irdelemeyi amaçlar. Ġç çatıĢma sırasında, 
muharipler –devlet yada isyancı grup- zor kullanarak destek toplamayı ve yerel halkın 
sağladığı insani ve lojistik desteği keserek düĢmanı felç etmeyi amaçlar. Muhariplerin 
bu eylemleri ciddi insan hakları ihlalleri ile sonuçlanır. Bu tez devlet ve PKK tarafından 
geçekleĢtirilen sivil mağduriyetlerin siyasi sonuçlarını değerlendirme teĢebbüsüdür. Ġki 
tip, rastgele ve seçici, mağduriyet ayrı ayrı incelenmiĢtir. Analiz boyunca devlet ve 
PKK tarafından gerçekleĢtirilen sivil mağduriyetlerin hükümet partisinin/partilerinin, 
sağ ve sol kanat partilerinin ve Kürt yanlısı (HADEP) ve aĢırı milliyetçi (MHP) 
partilerinin oy payları üzerindeki etkisini hesaplamak için çok değiĢkenli tobit 
regresyon kullandık. Sonuçlarımız devlet tarafından gerçekleĢtirilen rastgele 
mağduriyetin hükümet partilerinin seçmen nezdinde tasvip edilme oranlarını artırırken; 
PKK tarafından gerçekleĢtirilen mağruriyetin bu oranı düĢürdüğünü ortaya 
koymaktadır. Devlet tarafından gerçekleĢtirilen rastgele mağduriyete maruz kalan Türk 
seçmenleri, barıĢı sağlamak için isyancılara karĢı daha fazla taviz verme yanlısı olan, 
sol partilere oy vermektedir. HADEP oy payını hem devlet hem de PKK tarafından 
gerçkleĢtirilen rastgele mağduriyetlere karĢı artırmaktadır.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Turkey has been struggling with civil conflict since the first attack of the PKK (Partiya 
Karkaren Kurdistan; Kurdistan Workers‟ Party) in 1984. During this civil conflict the 
violent atmosphere reached a serious degree in the 1990s. The conflict threatened 
domestic peace, democracy and human rights. The combatant sides sought to gather 
support and paralyze the rival by cutting the human and logistic support of the local 
people by resorting to violence. Here are the two examples from the incidents that were 
common during the 1990s: 
   “KarĢıyaka village located in the Kozluk district of Batman province was 
raided by soldiers on September 1, 1995. During the raid, Medeni Altan, 
Mehmet Altan (the village headman), Dersim Altan and Rahmi Arıtürk 
were taken into custody and sent to Kozluk Gendarme Station. The village, 
which consisted of 11 households, was raided twice the same night. During 
the second raid, the houses were strafed with heavy weapons by the soldiers. 
3 children were wounded, and all of the vineyards and orchards, and farms 
were burned down around the village” (TĠHV, 1995 Annual Report, pg.93). 
 
   “Atabilen hamlet located in Akdoğu village of the Gürpınar district of Van 
province was raided by PKK militants. 2 village guards, 2 children, 6 
women and 2 men were killed because of the random firing of the PKK. 
During the attack, 13 people, mostly village guards, were wounded and 4 
houses were ruined by burning” (TĠHV, 1995 Annual Report, pg. 117). 
 
The PKK tried to keep the local people under control by using force, and mostly 
targeted teachers, schools and the families of village guards, who represented state 
authority in the south-east region. The state tortured local people who were accused of 
providing logistic support to the PKK, and forced people to become village guards. 
Villages were raided and strafed frequently and randomly. The statements of state 
officials stigmatized and blamed Kurdish identity, and Turks and Kurds were forced 
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into confrontation.  Throughout the conflict, Turkish and Kurdish communities were 
politically mobilized, militarily socialized, and polarized around ethnic identities 
(Wood, 2008; Kıbrıs, 2014). The Kurdish people were excluded from the social and 
political space.  
Civil wars devastate the economic, social and political development of the host 
country. These three pillars of development are not mutually exclusive. Each pillar is in 
relationship with one another. Countries with civil wars receive lower FDI, lose capital, 
and achieve lower GDP and a higher poverty rates than their peaceful counterparts 
(Bandyopadhyay, Sandler & Younas, 2012; Carlton-Ford & Boop, 2010; Hoeffler & 
Reynal-Querol, 2003; Collier, Elliot, Hegre, Hoeffler, Reynal-Querol, & Sambanis, 
2003; Gates, Hegre, Nygard, & Strand, 2012). Also, the human costs of civil war that 
results from forced displacement, flight of human capital and death add a new burden to 
the host country. The countries‟ education (Shemyakina, 2011; Kıbrıs, 2015) and health 
(Ghobarah, Huth, & Russett, 2003) records are affected negatively. The economic costs, 
in relation with the human costs, degenerate existing social networks and political 
loyalties because the demography of the whole country is altered during the conflict. 
The conflict even changes the countries‟ ethnic demography by reshaping the existing 
cleavages and identity affiliations (Kalyvas, 2008). These are the economic and social 
results of civil conflict, but in this thesis we are interested in the political results of the 
conflict. 
Civil wars are mostly associated with the high costs in human life. The combatant 
sides target civilians consciously, but the results of this targeting can be either 
productive or counterproductive for the combatant side. The people may withdraw their 
support from the combatant side when they are exposed to violence (Condra & Shapiro, 
2012). However, this also depends on the type of the targeting or the identity of the 
perpetrator (Sullivian, 2014; Lyall, Blair & Imai, 2013). The impact of civilian targeting 
during civil wars on electoral outcomes has not widely been tested; the only examples 
come from the Israeli case, and are mainly classified under the terrorism literature. 
Gould and Klor (2010) argue that terrorist attacks alter the electoral choices of the 
people by shifting their preferences towards more concessionist leftist parties. However, 
in the case of a high level of terrorism, public support for right wing parties increases 
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(Berrebi & Klor, 2006). The other electoral outcome of civilian targeting is on the 
government party‟s vote share in the following elections. People hold the government 
responsible for their losses and approval for the government decreases (Bali, 2007). 
Also, the political space polarizes around radical parties that hold hardline positions on 
the conflict (Jaeger, Klor, Miaari & Paserman, 2008; Kıbrıs, 2014). 
This thesis is an attempt to contribute to the civil conflict and terrorism literature 
by investigating the impact of civilian targeting by the combatant sides on the electoral 
choices of the people. We utilize new data that we collected at the province level. While 
doing this, we cluster our analysis at the province level by examining the human rights 
violations in each province and the party preferences of people in the 1991, 1995 and 
1999 elections in Turkey. The main question of this thesis is, “What is the impact of 
human rights violations during a civil conflict on election results?” 
Throughout the thesis I use term “victimization” instead of “human rights 
violations.” I adopt this wartime strategy term since I evaluate only the incidents that is 
related with Kurdish conflict. Victimization includes the direct methods of harm to 
civilians: torture, bombing, firing, kidnapping civilians. Victimization also includes the 
indirect killings (or attempts to kill) of non-combatants by economic sanctions, sieges, 
blockages, forced migration, destruction and confiscation of shelter and food (Downes, 
2006). This analysis divides the victimization into two types according to the 
randomness degree of targeting: selective and indiscriminate victimization. 
Surprisingly, we find that the indiscriminate victimization by the state is 
associated with a positive impact on the government vote share; however, the selective 
victimization by the state and the PKK is associated with a decrease in the approval rate 
of the government in the eyes of voters. Indiscriminate victimization of both the state 
and the PKK is associated with an increase in the vote share of left wing parties, while 
the vote share of the right wing parties is associated negatively with indiscriminate 
victimization. Selective violence is associated with exactly the opposite impact on the 
vote share of the right and left wing parties. Selective violence is negatively associated 
with the vote share of left wing parties, while it is positively associated with the vote 
share of right wing parties. The pro-Kurdish HADEP increases its vote share in 
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response to the indiscriminate victimization by the both state and PKK, but the vote 
share of the party is negatively associated with selective victimization by the PKK. 
This thesis consists of the literature review, the historical background of the 
conflict and the politics of Turkey, an analysis of the data that I aggregated and the 
results. Finally, I present my conclusions and future research ideas.   
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 The Determinants of Violence during Civil War  
Civil wars are mostly associated with high costs in human life. The combatant sides, 
either incumbent or insurgent, in civil wars try to convince civilians to gain their 
support and cripple the rival by cutting the logistic and human support of the local 
people. For this purpose, combatant sides can use various strategies. One of these 
strategies is the use of coercive power by targeting civilians. Targeting civilians pays 
back differently, depending on the level of power asymmetry between combatant sides, 
the individual characteristics of populations such as the size of the population, or even 
the geographical characteristics of the conflict region (Herreros, 2006; Downes, 2007). 
First, we will examine the reasons for civilian targeting among the studies that are 
presented in the conflict literature. Second, we will investigate the 
determinants/correlates of the targeting. Finally, we will look at the consequences of the 
civilian targeting for the combatant sides.  
Among other explanations, there are two main discussions that challenge each 
other about the reasons for civilian deaths during civil war. On the one side, Kalyvas 
claims that civilian victimization is a result of struggle between fighting sides 
(incumbent and insurgent) to control territory and people (2006). According to Kalyvas, 
the level of control over territory determines the nature of the victimization. For 
example, an incumbent is more willing to use selective targeting to kill civilians within 
the territory over which the incumbent has a high level of control. The logic is that 
control over territory and people provides more information and makes possible 
selective targeting for the fighting side (incumbent or insurgent). With the same logic, 
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the greater usage of indiscriminate violence means the lesser control of the fighting side 
within that territory (Kalyvas, 2006; Kalyvas & Kocher, 2009). On the other side, 
Weinstein argues that the magnitude and intensity of civilian victimization is 
determined by the internal discipline mechanism of the fighting sides. He finds that the 
most abusive and violent behavior against civilians is observed within regions in which 
a combatant side is operating which is internally undisciplined and ethnically 
fragmented, and lacks an internal punishing mechanism (Humphreys & Weinstein, 
2006; Weinstein, 2007). In addition to these two discussions, Valentino, Huth and 
Balch-Lindsay argue that mass killings of civilians occur only in cases in which 
insurgency has large public support and seriously poses a challenge towards the regime 
(2004). The regime attacks people in desperation to cut the popular support for the 
insurgency, and the magnitude of the mass killing by the state correlates with the level 
of challenge that the insurgency poses to the regime.  
The aim of the state is to stop the insurgency and end the war as soon as possible. 
Therefore, civilian victimization by the state is a strategic and conscious choice as a 
counter-insurgency strategy, and the utilization of this strategy does not vary according 
to the type of the regime. Both democracies and autocracies exercise the strategy of 
targeting civilians. The general belief that civilian victimization and human rights 
violations are mostly associated with autocratic regimes has been challenged by 
Downes, and Cornell and Roberts. Downes argues that democratic governments are 
closely tied with the electorate, and if the electorate thinks that the government is 
wasting money and lives, it can withhold its support from the government. Therefore, 
democratic regimes may resort to targeting civilians because a protracted war means a 
loss of money and lives (Downes, 2006). Lower approval levels for the government will 
be the result; therefore, governments try to escape audience costs. Cornell and Roberts 
conducted a study that compares the democratic and military regimes of Peru and their 
human rights violation records during the civil war. The Peruvian case demonstrates 
that human rights violations and the abuse of civilians are common for both types of 
regimes (Cornell & Roberts, 1990). 
The other factor which is indicated in the literature that determines the 
effectiveness of civilian targeting is the type of the targeting. These studies focus on the 
 7 
accuracy of the targeting. For example, torture is accurate in targeting. Forced 
displacements and aerial or land artillery are conducted collectively and randomly select 
the victims. This accuracy and randomness in the targeting of civilians determine the 
type of the targeting and its effectiveness. For example, according to Bennett, avoiding 
collateral damage with selective targeting is more effective as a counterinsurgency 
strategy (2008). Otherwise, the collective targeting of civilians becomes 
counterproductive in suppressing the insurgency since it creates new grievances towards 
the state and enlarges the recruitment pool for the insurgency. The general rule that has 
become prominent in the literature is that targeting civilians is only effective when it is 
selective targeting (Kalyvas, 2006; Lyall, 2009; Kocher, Pepinsky & Kalyvas, 2011). 
However, there are also some exceptions to this rule. For example, Downes argues that 
even selective targeting is worthless when the civilian ethnic and religious loyalties are 
not flexible (2007).  
The existing research on the consequences of civilian victimization provides a 
picture under a detailed classification of the type of targeting. The consequences of 
collateral damage, torture, suicide attacks, and targeted or indiscriminate violence are 
examined in different cases. The type of violence either selective or indiscriminate 
determines the relationship between combatant parties and civilians. Selective violence 
gives credibility to the targeting of that party by personalizing the threat. People think 
that the person is punished only because of his/her actions. Therefore, selective violence 
became justifiable in the eyes of the public and this mechanism creates victim 
compliance with perpetrator (Downes, 2007). Indiscriminate violence gives a message 
to civilians that compliance with combatant party does not change their chance of 
survival. No matter what civilians done or doing, they are under threat in either 
compliance or noncompliance cases. Therefore, Kalyvas argues that selective violence 
is productive and indiscriminate violence is counter-productive for the combatant sides‟ 
chances of winning war (2004).  
Condra and Shapiro find that the Iraqi people punish the perpetrator (state or 
insurgent) because of the collateral damage by sharing less information which would be 
useful for future operations (2012). Another study on Afghanistan reveals that civilian 
attitudes towards the perpetrator are asymmetric depending on the ideological proximity 
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of the perpetrator. People are more willing to punish the international security forces 
than the Taliban (Lyall, Blair & Imai, 2013). The study of Sullivian demonstrates that 
torturing civilians is not useful in stopping an insurgency, and it is counterproductive 
because it provokes a higher insurgent violence back (2014). In the Israeli case, the 
suicide attacks of Palestinians that cost Israeli lives are responded to with harsh 
counterattacks by Israel to take revenge. On the other side, the targeted killings of Israel 
cause a pause on the Palestinian side, which means it works as counter-insurgency 
strategy for Israel (Jaeger & Paserman, 2009). However, there is other research which 
claims that civilian victimization can be useful as a counter-insurgency strategy. Lyall 
finds the Russian strategy to kill the Chechen civilians worked by reducing the activity 
of the insurgent groups. Lyall challenges the idea that indiscriminate violence towards 
civilians is an indicator of the state‟s desperation. He claims indiscriminate violence 
that targets civilians may cause a detrimental impact on insurgent communication, and 
logistic and recruitment capabilities, so it becomes useful (Lyall, 2009). Therefore when 
we take the literature as a whole, we cannot extract a clear picture about the outcomes 
of selective or indiscriminate targeting as a counter-insurgency strategy. However, we 
can conclude this discussion by adapting the general tendency in the literature and claim 
that indiscriminate victimization is counter-productive and selective victimization is 
productive as a counter-insurgency strategy, without neglecting the exceptional cases 
and situations.  
There are studies which indicate that civilian victimization is counterproductive in 
the long run. For example, the case of El Salvador suggests that indiscriminate violence 
against civilians creates a long-term resistance among civilians which is hard to 
overcome in the following periods of the war. The number of incidents makes it harder 
to reach a peace agreement that follows the civil war (Peceny & Stanley, 2010). The 
relationship between the combatant side and the people determines the success of the 
party that competes for the democratic elections that follow the civil war. If the 
combatant side constructs a good relationship with civilians with less violent means, the 
success of the party tends to be higher because voting will be voluntary and widespread 
(Allison, 2010).  
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2.2 Electoral Behavior  
The study of electoral behavior is dominated by three major schools. The first one is the 
sociological model claims that people are voting according to their socio-economic 
status (class and occupation), religious and ethnic identity, the area of residence 
(geography), age, and gender. One of the prominent works on the sociological model 
finds that the informal communication networks of the people are the main determinants 
of decision making on voting (Lazarfeld et al., 1944). The people are under the 
influence of their social surroundings. Interpersonal discussion networks such as 
relatives and colleagues, and mass media and political organizations can alter the 
voter‟s decision (Beck, Dalton, Greene and Huckfeldt, 2002). Therefore, the 
sociological model implies that voting is not an individual decision, but it depends on 
the group cohesion that we live in (Antunes, 2010). However, the sociological model 
falls short of explaining short term vote swings, since we do not expect immediate 
changes in people‟s identity, class or community they live in.  
The second school is the partisanship model that incorporates the social and issue 
based voting models. The claim of this model is that voting is an outcome of the both 
distal factors such as the socio-economic level, values, and attitudes of social group; 
and the proximal factors such as issues, candidates, campaigns and economic situation 
(Antunes, 2010). The partisanship model, or in other words, the party identification 
model implies that people identify their ideological position with a party because of 
various reasons and remain loyal to the party for lifelong. The partisanship or party 
identification originates from the socialization of the people in their early age in peer 
group and family. This identification is not strict. It can change by marriage, entrance to 
the higher education, and change in job or residence (Antunes, 2010). For example, 
Belanger and Meguid (2008) find that partisan affiliation and socio-economic factors 
(geographical region of residence, education level and religious identity) affect the vote 
choice of Canadians.  
The third school is the rational choice model, which aims to explain whether 
voting behavior is rational or not. According to this model, people do not vote 
according to their social identity, but vote for the party that they benefit most from. 
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They behave like a customer in their relations with the political parties (Antunes, 2010). 
Apart from these three schools we have two more specific voting behavior explanations. 
The first one is the issue based model and the second one is the economic model of 
voting.   
Political parties own different issues. For example, British Labor Party is trusted 
for their education policies, and this general belief of people determines their vote 
choices. However, the issue ownership cannot explain the vote swings, in the short run. 
The issue ownership becomes crucial when the issue is salient for the community. An 
issue cannot be salient for a long time period, the vote swings can be explained by the 
swings in the issues that are salient for the community. For example Edwards et al. 
present that issues vary in salience in the eyes of the public, and that the salience of 
issues also has an impact on the evaluation of the president, as well as on the votes 
(1995). The salient issue can be security if the country has experienced a terrorist attack, 
or it can be ethnic identity if the country has cleavages around ethnicity (Wilkinson & 
Haid, 2009). The economic factors are also highly related with the voting choices of 
people. The voter holds the government responsible for the economic outcomes. There 
are two main indicators, which are commonly used in economic voting literature, that 
are explanatory for the economic voting. The most commonly employed indicators are 
employment and inflation rates. Unemployment is more essential for lower segments of 
the society and inflation for the higher segments of the society (Lewis-Beck &Paldam, 
2000; Wlezien, 2005).  
2.3 Political Violence and Electoral Behavior: the Point of Junction  
The research on the impact of violence on political behavior is mostly delimited within 
the terrorism literature. The study of Hutchinson over 32 countries which reveals that 
„individuals who feel threatened by insurgency based violence become less politically 
tolerant‟ (2014) is supported by several case studies. Gould and Klor (2010) argue that 
terrorist attacks alter the voting behavior and political attitude of people. Israelis 
become more willing to give territorial concessions and accept a Palestinian state, and 
identify themselves less as right wing party supporters only under a small dosage of 
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terrorist attacks. Beyond a certain threshold the attacks become counterproductive for 
the Palestinian side since they create resistance among Israeli people about giving 
concessions. For example, after a high level of terrorism, the public support for right 
wing parties increases (Berrebi & Klor, 2006). Also, the timing of attacks is strategic, 
since we know the impact of the attacks increases as it gets closer to the elections 
(Berrebi &Klor, 2008). On the side of Palestinians, Israeli violence leads Palestinians to 
support more radical factions, and violence lowers the support for a peace agreement 
with the Israel government (Jaeger, Klor, Miaari & Paserman, 2008).  
Beyond the Israeli studies, De la Calle and Bali bring evidence from Spain. Their 
study on the relationship between ETA attacks and the electoral support for Batasuna 
(the political branch of ETA) shows that ETA‟s killings of non-nationalist politicians 
decreases the electoral support for Batasuna (De la Calle & Sanchez-Cuenca, 2013). 
Bali investigates the impact of March 2004 Madrid bombings. The bombing creates an 
electoral upset towards the incumbent (2007). The studies on the Turkish case provide 
detailed evidence on the relationship between terrorist attacks and electoral choices. The 
research of Kıbrıs exhibits that Turkish voters are highly sensitive to the terrorist 
attacks. Turkish voters, those exposed to terrorist attacks, are more likely to support 
right wing parties which are less concessionist towards terrorism (2011). An 
experimental study (Echebarria-Echabe & Fernandez-Guede, 2006) that measures the 
sociological impacts of the 2004 Madrid bombings in Spain reveals that people develop 
more allegiance to conservative values. In contrast to this trend liberal values are 
declining. Another study by Kıbrıs reveals that Turkish people are polarized along the 
ethnic identity by voting for hardliner parties as the number of terrorism casualties 
increases (2014).  
In summary, the literature about the political impacts of violence proceeds on 
three different layers. During civil wars, governments and insurgents may resort 
targeting civilians to win the war. The consequences of this targeting depend on the 
individual characteristics of the cases and the parties that fight. Also the type of the 
targeting plays a crucial role on the outcome. However, the civil war literature focuses 
on practical results of this civilian victimization by investigating whether it is 
productive or counterproductive for winning the war. The terrorism literature covers 
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this gap by investigating the political impacts of terror attacks. However, these studies 
cannot fully grasp the issue from the insurgency perspective. Also, these studies fall 
short of differentiating the type of targeting. Therefore, we cannot detect the political 
outcomes of civilian victimization during civil wars. While investigating the 
relationship between civilian victimization and political outcomes, the voting behavior 
literature fills the gap about the social and economic factors that influence the political 
decision making of people.  
Based on three branches of literature that we examine, I expect that the impact 
of selective victimization by state will be productive for the government parties; 
therefore, the government parties will increase its vote share as the cases of selective 
victimization increase in that province. On the contrary, indiscriminate victimization 
will decrease the vote share of government parties, since people will feel under threat no 
matter of their actions. They will blame the government parties because of their losses 
and the compliance of civilians to government parties will decrease. The PKK 
victimization will hurt the government party vote share, since people will think that the 
government parties are lack of competency to prevent the PKK activities. Here I do not 
have different hypothesis for the indiscriminate and selective victimization by PKK.  
The second part of the analysis will be based on the left and right wing parties‟ 
vote share in response to state and PKK victimization incidents. Here I do not expect 
any difference between the impact of selective and indiscriminate victimization cases on 
right and left wing parties. I argue that PKK victimization has a positive impact on right 
wing party vote share and negative on left wing party vote share. People will think that 
right wing parties can restrain the violence by taking harsher measures than left wing 
parties. On the contrary, state victimization cases will decrease the right wing party vote 
share and increase the left wing party vote share. People who are victimized by the state 
want a left wing party that commands the state because the left wing parties tend to take 
unarmed measures for the resolution of the conflict.  
In the third part of the analysis I expect that HADEP and MHP that represent the 
two opposite camps in the fighting, not directly but ideologically, will increase their 
vote share for both state and PKK indiscriminate victimizations. The state 
indiscriminate victimization will increase the vote share of HADEP and decrease 
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MHP‟s vote share, and likewise PKK indiscriminate victimization will decrease 
HADEP‟s vote share and increase MHP‟s vote share. Since we argue that selective 
violence will create compliance to perpetrator, selective victimization by state will 
decrease HADEP‟s vote share and increase MHP‟s vote share. Like, state perpetrated 
victimizations, selective victimization by PKK will increase HADEP‟s vote share and 
decrease MHP‟s vote share.  
Here I should put a reminder on the fact that my analysis is based on the 
province level I do not have any claim on the national level about the impacts of 
victimization cases. The hypotheses that I stated above only comprise the province 
level.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT AND POLITICS OF TURKEY 
The civil conflict in Turkey has continued between the PKK and Turkish state forces 
over the last thirty years. The conflict has mainly concentrated on the Kurdish populated 
south-eastern region of the country. The PKK demands cultural rights for Kurds and 
aims to establish a regional autonomy under a federal state structure in the south-east of 
Turkey. The regional concentration of the conflict has provided an opportunity to the 
state to concentrate military repression, forced assimilation and coercion on the region 
under a state of emergency status from the late 1980s through 1990s. At the same time, 
the regional concentration became leverage by providing a nest with harsh terrain for 
insurgents (Nigogosian, 1996). The human and economic costs of the conflict have 
accumulated over the years. Between 1984 and 2012, 7,918 state officials, including 
police and army members; 22,101 PKK members; and 5,557 civilians lost their lives 
during incidents related with the Kurdish conflict (TR GNA, Human Rights 
Investigation Commission, 2013). The total number of 35,576 does not include 
unidentified murders, missing people, and those lost under custody, which were 
common during the 1990s.  
The Turkish state ideology had been constructed on centralism and nationalism; 
therefore, legal measures that would embrace ethnic and religious plurality were not 
taken until 2009 (Aktürk, 2012). The definition of Turkish identity which is based on 
assimilation and homogeneity does not allow for expression of ethnic identity. This 
exclusive ideology created political and cultural cleavages between Turkish nationalists 
and the Kurdish people, and most of the time Kurds were denied expression of their 
identity as the disadvantaged party (Gürbey, 1996; Aktürk, 2012). For example, 
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ġerafettin Elçi, Minister of Irrigation and Public Works, was sentenced to a two-and-a-
half year imprisonment for stating “Kurds exist, and I am a Kurd” in 1983.  
The Kurds compose the largest ethnic minority in Turkey with over 18 percent of 
the population by 2010 (KONDA, 2011). The founding treaty of Lausanne only 
approves non-Muslim communities, specifically Greek, Armenian and Jewish people in 
minority status. In 1924 with Lausanne, the Muslim minorities, for example Kurds and 
Arabs suddenly lost their cultural and social rights under the name of Turkish 
nationalism (Muller, 1996). Despite these developments, the initial sparks of Kurdish 
rebellions in south-east Anatolia came after the first secularization measures. 
Secularization came into being with the abolishment of Caliphate in 1924, which was 
the last institution that highlighted the commonality between Kurds and Turks under 
Islam. The Sheik Sait Rebellion (1925), Ağrı Rebellion (1927-30) and Dersim 
Rebellion (1937-38) are the most famous, but not the only initial reactions. These 
rebellions were small scale and reactionary until the 1980s (Saatçi, 2002) and framed as 
side effects of tribal banditry, and abuse of sheikdoms or chiefs over the uncivilized 
people by state officials. However, these waves of rebellions were enough to label 
Kurdish identity as a threat to unity of the country (Yeğen, 1999).  
The Kurdish issue transformed and became a new controversy in the political life 
of Turkish parties with the transition to multi-party elections in 1950. The Democrat 
Party (DP) rose as a challenger to state policies towards Kurdish people; however the 
DP could not challenge the old Republican People‟s Party (CHP) ethnic and nationalist 
ideology. The party conceptualized the Kurdish issue as a socio-economic development 
and democracy problem of the region and never uttered the word „Kurd‟ explicitly 
(Aktürk, 2012). Also, the rise of the USSR threat in the North forced people to unite 
around the national identity against the outside threat (Saatçi, 2002).  
The 1960 military coup disturbed the political liberalization attempts of the 1950s 
and followed the previous assimilation ideology. However, the 1961 constitution 
brought awareness of civil and political rights among university students. Kurdish 
people also embraced their ethnic identity, touched by political optimism and freedom 
(KiriĢçi & Windrow, 1997). During the 1960s the Kurdish population was mainly 
represented by the New Turkey Party (YTP), successor of the DP, and the Marxist 
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Labor Party (TĠP). The voting turnout rates in south-east Turkey were also high during 
the 1960s, but this high rate was mostly a result of close relations between Kurdish 
tribal leaders and the political elites of the YTP. Unlike the YTP, the TĠP was the first 
political party that mentioned the economic and cultural problems of Kurdish people. 
The party publicly uttered the word „Kurdish‟ and discussed the Kurdish problem in 
Turkey, but with the 1971 coup, the party was closed down by the constitutional court 
(KiriĢçi & Windrow, 1997; Aktürk, 2012).  
During the first half of the 1970s, Kurdish votes shifted to leftist parties. The CHP 
under the leadership of Ecevit gathered the Kurdish votes in the 1973 elections. 
Sectarian and ethnic identity became the issues that determined the voters‟ behavior and 
choices in the 1970s, and the ideological proximity between Marxist and Kurdish 
groups diminished, with a number of Kurdish leftist groups multiplying, one of them 
being the PKK (KiriĢçi & Windrow, 1997). The 1970s also were marked by the rise of 
the Islamist National Salvation Party (MSP) under the leadership of Erbakan. The party 
did not emphasize ethnicity, but adopted a different point of view by marketing the 
Islamic community ummah idea to attract Kurdish votes (Aktürk, 2012).  
Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan (PKK), or the Kurdish Workers Party, was rooted 
and fed on the ideologies of the Iraqi Kurdish Nationalist movement KDP-Iraq; the 
Marxist Workers Party of Turkey (TĠP); and the movement of Turkish Federation of 
Revolutionary Youth of Turkey (DEV-GENÇ) (Gürbey, 1996). The PKK was founded 
as a leftist Kurdish group in 1974 in Ankara, but it distinguished itself from the other 
leftist organizations. The PKK moved its operations to the Kurdish populated south-east 
of Turkey in 1975, and with support from the Syrian regime in a short time it was able 
to recruit Syrian Kurds and attend education camps in Palestine (Gunter, 1997). At the 
first meeting of the PKK, Kurdish populated areas were depicted as Turkey‟s colony 
that had been kept under control with the collaboration of Kurdish feudalists and state 
elites (KiriĢçi & Windrow, 1997). The initial goal of the 1980s, founding an 
independent state for the Kurds, transformed to the idea of autonomous region for the 
Kurds. For this purpose the PKK has used „revolutionary violence,‟ as they called it, 
since 1984 (Gürbey, 1996).  
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In 1980 Turkey experienced another military coup because of political right-left 
polarization among the society and deadlock in the election of a new president. Military 
rule reasserted the assimilation policies against Kurdish identity. By highlighting the 
indivisibility of the country, other languages were forbidden to be used in public with 
the new constitution. A great deal of state propaganda both printed and broadcast, about 
the common descent of Kurds and Turks were published, and denial of the existence of 
Kurdish identity became a national campaign. Religion was also used as a counter force 
against Marxist and separatist ideals under the so-called Turkish-Islamic Synthesis 
(KiriĢçi & Windrow, 1997).  
The 1980 military intervention once again disturbed the political cleavages and 
altered the ethnic and religious camps. This time the normalization and stabilization of 
politics on ethnic issues was very hard because open conflict between the Turkish state 
and PKK started in 1984. The first attack of the PKK in ġemdinli and Eruh resulted in 
the death of twenty one soldiers in the south-eastern part of Turkey. The PKK attacked 
military, civilian and economic targets. In order to weaken the state presence in the 
region, the PKK attacked dams, communication and power lines, factories, schools, and 
teachers. Tourists and state officials were kidnapped, opponents of the PKK 
assassinated, urban center targeted with suicide bombings, and villages destroyed and 
raided by the PKK (Gürbey, 1996). On the state side, the military which had a supreme 
position within politics and administrative structure of Turkey was the leading actor in 
fighting against the PKK. The state tried to eliminate public support for the PKK. In 
their fight against the PKK, state security forces employed systematic torture, 
extrajudicial killings and wholesale destruction of Kurdish populated villages (Muller, 
1996). Not only the military and police, but also other actors took a role in the fighting. 
For example, in 1985 the village guard system was initiated to resolve the logistic 
problems of the central state and to create income for local people. Local people were 
armed by the state and this armed unit was directly tied to the Ministry of the Interior 
(Gürbey, 1996). This practice created many problems and discussions. The village 
guards were involved in the killing of rival tribe members and arms smuggling. Also, 
non-state armed actors, which are believed to have been funded by the state, the Turkish 
Hizbullah, engaged in killings of civilians who were sympathizers of the PKK (KiriĢçi 
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& Windrow, 1997). In 1987 a new multiregional governor, who was authorized with the 
power to suspend civil rights and liberties, was formed in Diyarbakır. The ongoing war 
led to the politicization of people who were affected by violence, the polarization of 
conflicting parties and the militarization of politics, with massive human rights 
violations by the state and PKK (Gürbey, 1996).  
During the 1980s, the old political cleavages were altered with new ethnic and 
religious divides. Turkish versus Kurdish ethnic nationalist, Turkish civic nationalist 
versus ethnic nationalist, Alevi versus Sunni brotherhoods, secular versus religious 
fundamentalist voting divisions became bolder (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005). In the 1987 
elections the leftist Social Democrat Populist Party (SHP) and the Islamist Welfare 
Party (RP) competed for the Kurdish votes. The Kurdish feudal elites mostly preferred 
the center-right Motherland Party (ANAP) and the True Path Party (DYP). In the 1991 
elections, the SHP and the pro-Kurdish People‟s Party (HEP) formed an electoral 
alliance, while the RP cooperated with the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party 
(MHP). The Kurdish votes shifted towards the SHP because of these new party 
alignments (Aktürk, 2012). The HEP entered in the parliament in 1991 with 18 deputies 
with a definite Kurdish agenda for the first time (KiriĢçi & Windrow, 1997). In 1993 the 
HEP was closed by the Constitutional Court. The deputies of the HEP registered for the 
Democracy Party (DEP) which was founded in 1993, but the party again closed in 1994. 
The deputies of the DEP were accused for collaborating with the PKK and the four 
deputies were imprisoned after the abolishment of parliamentary immunity of 13 DEP 
deputies in 1994. 
The real organizational shape of the PKK became apparent at the beginning of the 
1990s. The emphasis of Marxist ideology was replaced with Kurdish nationalism in the 
PKK discourse. President Özal saw the 1st Gulf War as an opportunity for the resolution 
of the Kurdish problem and took liberal steps to integrate the Kurdish population into 
the Turkish political life. Özal removed the ban on the usage of Kurdish language in 
public space in 1991. He also gave signals for further cultural rights on Kurdish 
education and broadcasting (Gürbey, 1996). Özal initiated a rapprochement between the 
state and PKK with opening peace talks, however he died in 1993. In the years 
following of his death, the influence of the army on politics resurfaced again. The 
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following political actors could not balance the power of the army and acted in line with 
the army in the solution of Kurdish problem. The emergency decree in the ten Kurdish 
provinces was tighten up by the so-called Censorship and Banishment Decree that 
grants further authority to the special governor of the Kurdish populated provinces. In 
response to these developments, the PKK, by declaring there was no positive response 
from the state for the demands of immediate halt of the state of emergency, cease-fire, 
general amnesty and granting cultural rights for Kurds, suspended the unilateral 
ceasefire and returned to fighting (Gürbey, 1996).  
During 1990s, Turkish electoral and political party divisions were reshaped and 
new dimensions were added to the existing left-right political cleavages. Starting from 
the mid 1990s, the two new political cleavages added new segments to the Turkish 
political arena. The first was the religious versus secular divide (Çarkoğlu & Hinich, 
2006; Secor, 2001). The second was the ultra-nationalist versus Kurdish divide. 
Specifically, the 1995 elections were remarked with the rise of the pro-Islamist right, 
and in the 1999 elections we observed the rise of nationalist right. Both of these newly 
born cleavages gained electoral allegiance in expense of center-right parties. Beside the 
transformation on the right, the left mostly kept its position in the both elections (Esmer, 
2002; Çarkoğlu & Hinich, 2006). These new dimensions on the political cleavages were 
reflected on the electoral regions (Çarkoğlu & Avcı, 2002). The ultra-nationalist MHP 
and the pro-Islamist RP filled the void of defending religious sensitivity that was left by 
the center-right parties. Even if we classify these two parties as right-wing based on 
their positions on religious issues, there are also some other classifications; for example 
Hale classified the MHP and FP, successor of the RP, as left wing parties because of 
their position on the economic issues (2002). Therefore, these parties mostly gathered 
votes from economically neglected areas such as urban poor, rural masses and 
Anatolian towns. Also, another classification can be made based on the position about 
ethnic identity, that cut across the class and religious identity (GüneĢ-Ayata & Ayata, 
2002). The ultra-nationalist MHP had the most extremist position on Kurdish issue. The 
party totally supported military solution and denied the existence of Kurdish ethnicity. 
The pro-Islamist RP and later FP adopted the most inclusive rhetoric on the Kurdish 
issue. The party supported any cultural concessions on broadcasting and education in 
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Kurdish. They put blame on the secular regime that ignored the religious freedom of 
Kurds and Turks those are brothers under Islam about the Kurdish issue (Beriker, 
1997). 
The 1990s was the decade of consolidation of the PKK and escalation of fighting 
between the army and PKK. These developments also made and impact on the center-
right and center-left parties towards the Kurdish issue. While right wing parties took 
more hardliner position, the left wing parties shifted towards more exclusivist and 
assimilationist position also. One of the center right parties the ANAP, the former party 
of President Özal, adopted more nationalist policies from the start of the mid 1990s. The 
other center right party the DYP took a hawkish position towards the Kurdish issue. 
Especially after the political crisis that resulted with the imprisonment of the DEP 
deputies and closure of the party. The DYP totally adopted a rhetoric that opposed any 
talk and giving cultural rights by stating the famous motto „state does not negotiate with 
terrorists‟ (Nigogosian, 1996). On the other side of the political party spectrum the 
picture does not change. Center-left parties made the distinction of the Kurdish problem 
and the terror problem. One of the center-left parties the DSP, which was the major 
coalitional partner after 1997, saw the Kurdish problem as the result of regional 
underdevelopment and feudal social structure. The other center-left party CHP, joined 
by SHP, also took more nationalist position on the Kurdish issue and claimed that the 
problem lied on the center of the mechanism of democracy in Turkey (Beriker, 1997).  
The pro-Kurdish parties the DEP and later the People‟s Democracy Party 
(HADEP) were mainly classified as left-wing parties according to the pools of voters‟ 
positing of the parties (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005). However, the party was solely constructed 
its identity around the Kurdish issue. The general definition of Chandra of an ethnic 
party (2011) „that is champion of particular interests of one ethnic category‟ that is 
conveyed in the party‟s „implicit or explicit messages or campaigns‟ was met by 
HADEP in the Turkish concept. After observing the closure of the DEP, HADEP took a 
more moderate position on the Kurdish issue and kept distance between the party and 
PKK (KiriĢçi & Windrow, 1997).  
In the Western Europe conjuncture the right and left divide is made based on the 
parties‟ position on economic policies. The left and right wing party divisions in Turkey 
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are complicated and maintained on different levels of political dimensions. For 
example, Turkish people generally refer to the religious positions of the parties while 
making the distinction of right and left wing (Aydoğan & Slapin, 2015). However, we 
have one more political dimension for right-left classification for the Turkish case, the 
position on the ethnic identity. For the simplicity, in our analysis we take the 
classification of Kalaycıoğlu (2005) and Esmer (2002) according to these classification 
the RP/FP, ANAP, DYP and MHP are located on right wing, and the HADEP, 
SHP/CHP and DSP are located on left wing.  
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CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
4.1 The Model  
I use a multivariate tobit regression model to estimate the association between civilian 
victimization and vote choice in the Turkish case, and that is basically; 
𝑉{𝑡 ,𝑖} = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁{𝑡 ,𝑖} + 𝛽2𝑆{𝑡,𝑖} + 𝛽3𝐶{𝑡 ,𝑖} + 𝛽4𝐸{𝑡 ,𝑖} + 𝑢{𝑖} + e{t,i} 
The unit of analysis is year-province. The data incorporates three observations for each 
province, for those three general elections of 1991, 1995 and 1999. The data is 
chronologically and geographically clustered into the provinces. Our dependent variable 
is parties‟ vote share, denoted by 𝑉{𝑡 ,𝑖}. We examine the impact of number of civilian 
victimization on the vote share of the party at election time t and in district i. The main 
independent variables are selective and indiscriminate civilian victimizations, and they 
are performed by either state or PKK in the province i. We analyze the impact of these 
incidents conducted by the state and PKK. The 𝑁{𝑡 ,𝑖}  and 𝑆{𝑡 ,𝑖}  vectors represent the 
number of civilian victimization cases as we classified the cases Indiscriminate and 
Selective respectively, in district i between the time period that covers after the election 
at time t-1 and before the election at time t. Indiscriminate victimization denotes the 
total number of indiscriminate victimization incidents, which is random and without 
prior selection of the victims, in that province. Selective victimization denotes the total 
number of selective victimization incidents, which is individualized targeting, in that 
province. The detailed coding rules and distinction between indiscriminate and selective 
victimization can be found under the data section. 𝐶{𝑡 ,𝑖} is the vector of socio-economic 
and demographic control variables at time t in district i. This includes population size, 
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population growth rate, GDP per capita, doctor per bed, urbanization rate. 𝐸{𝑡 ,𝑖}  is 
dummy variable that takes value of 1 in existence of emergency state 0 otherwise for the 
time t in district i.  
The analysis is threefold according to the three different dependent variables. In 
the first part we analyze the impact of civilian victimization on government 
party/parties‟ vote share. 
𝐺{𝑡 ,𝑖} = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁{𝑡 ,𝑖} + 𝛽2𝑆{𝑡 ,𝑖} + 𝛽3𝐶{𝑡 ,𝑖} + 𝛽4𝐸{𝑡 ,𝑖} + 𝑢{𝑖} + e{t,i} 
𝐺{𝑡 ,𝑖} denotes the change in the vote share of the government party between the election 
at time t-1 and the election at time t. Turkish politics was dominated by the coalition 
governments during 1990s. Therefore I will aggregate the vote share of parties that form 
the government and look at the differences in the vote share between the election at time 
t and the election time t-1. The government parties are DYP and SHP for 1991-1995; 
and ANAP, DYP, RP and DSP for 1995-1999 time periods. I also present the results in 
which I evaluate government parties performance by excluding DSP. I expect state 
indiscriminate victimization to be negatively associated with the government parties‟ 
vote share for the elections proceeding the violence since it creates resentment among 
the voters against the government because of their losses (Kocher, Pepinsky & Kalyvas; 
Bennett, 2998). State selective victimization is expected to be positively associated with 
the vote share of the government parties because selective violence is believed to be 
perpetrated by actors with full control of territory. Therefore, the perpetrator is expected 
to be effective in suppressing the dissident without gathering large reactions from the 
people (Kalyvas, 2006). In response to PKK perpetrated victimizations people will 
expectedly blame the government parties due to its inability to protect people from the 
PKK violence (Bali, 2007; Kıbrıs, 2011); therefore, I expect a negative association 
between PKK perpetrated victimization and government vote share.  
In the second part of analysis, I aim to estimate the association between civilian 
victimizations and the left and right wing parties‟ vote share. Turkey has a multi-party 
system, so we cannot talk about a single party on either right or left wing. Therefore I 
aggregate the parties‟ vote shares which are identified as right or left wing by taking 
classification of Esmer (2002) and Kalaycıoğlu (2005). According to this classification 
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the RP/FP, ANAP, DYP and MHP are right wing, and the HADEP, DSP and SHP/CHP 
are left wing parties. 
𝑅{𝑡 ,𝑖} = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁{𝑡 ,𝑖} + 𝛽2𝑆{𝑡 ,𝑖} + 𝛽3𝐶{𝑡 ,𝑖} + 𝛽4𝐸{𝑡 ,𝑖} + 𝑢{𝑖} + e{t,i} 
𝐿{𝑡 ,𝑖} = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁{𝑡,𝑖} + 𝛽2𝑆{𝑡,𝑖} + 𝛽3𝐶{𝑡 ,𝑖} + 𝛽4𝐸{𝑡 ,𝑖} + 𝑢{𝑖} + e{t,i} 
R{t,i} is the vector for the right wing parties‟ vote share at the election at time t in district 
i, and L{t,i} is the vector for the left wing parties‟ vote share at the election at time t in 
district i. I expect indiscriminate victimization by the state to be negatively associated 
with the vote share of right wing parties and positively associated with the left wing 
parties. People, who are victimized by the state, aim to prevent this violence by voting 
for a left wing party which is less supportive for armed action as counter-insurgency 
strategy. The vote share of right wing parties, which take harsher military measures, 
will be affected negatively since people do not want further victimization. In response 
to the indiscriminate victimization of PKK, I expect that people will vote for right wing 
parties, which are known to have a less concessionist attitude towards insurgency. I 
expect that people will act in order to take revenge for their losses (Berrebi & Klor, 
2006, 2008; Kıbrıs, 2011). I do not expect that selective victimization by the state and 
PKK will yield any different results than indiscriminate victimization. However, 
investigating selective victimization separately would be beneficial for detailing our 
analysis.  
In the final part of analysis, I estimate the impact of civilian victimization on the 
vote share of pro-Kurdish HADEP and ultra-nationalist MHP‟s vote share.  
𝐻𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑃{𝑡 ,𝑖} = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁{𝑡,𝑖} + 𝛽2𝑆{𝑡,𝑖} + 𝛽3𝐶{𝑡 ,𝑖} + 𝛽4𝐸{𝑡 ,𝑖} + 𝑢{𝑖} + e{t,i} 
𝑀𝐻𝑃{𝑡 ,𝑖} = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁{𝑡,𝑖} + 𝛽2𝑆{𝑡,𝑖} + 𝛽3𝐶{𝑡 ,𝑖} + 𝛽4𝐸{𝑡 ,𝑖} + 𝑢{𝑖} + e{t,i} 
HADEP{t,i} is the vector for the right wing parties‟ vote share at the election at time t in 
district i, and MHP{t,i} is the vector for the left wing parties‟ vote share at the election at 
time t in district i. Unfortunately I can observe these parties‟ performances for only the 
1995 and 1999 elections. In this analysis I will test the argument of Hirsch-Hoefler, 
Canetti and Pedahzur‟s about voting motivations for radical right. Hirsch-Hoefler et al. 
finds that beside the ideological affinity, an existing security threat motivates people to 
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vote for radical right wing party in Israel (2010). Violence leads people to support more 
radical fractions that polarized around the salient issue, for Turkish case it is the 
Kurdish problem (Jaeger, Klor, Miaari & Paserman, 2008; Kıbrıs, 2014). The killings 
are costly for both sides; people tend to punish the perpetrator side by sharing less 
information if they get hurt by this side (Condra & Shapiro, 2011). 
I associate MHP with the state forces and HADEP with PKK forces because of 
the ideological proximity of these actors. Therefore, I expect the vote share of HADEP 
to increase and the vote share of the MHP to decreases in provinces which experience 
indiscriminate victimization by the state forces. With same logic, the PKK‟s 
indiscriminate victimization is expected to be negatively associated with the vote share 
of HADEP, and positively associated with the vote share of MHP. Selective violence is 
expected to be performed in the territory that the combatant sides has full control over, 
and selective violence is expected to be used to consolidate existing power (Kalyvas, 
2006). Therefore, I expect that state selective victimization to be negatively associated 
with the vote share of HADEP, and positively the vote share of MHP. Also, I expect the 
PKK‟s selective victimization to be negatively associated with the vote share of MHP, 
and positively associated with the vote share of HADEP. 
I include socioeconomic socio-economic and demographic variables to control for 
factors that are expected to have an impact on electoral choices. Voting behavior of 
people is shaped by the social groups that they belong to (Beck, Allen, Dalton, Greene 
& Huckfeldt, 2002; Antunes, 2010). Population size and the urbanization rate of the 
province would give hint for the structure of the province. Small population size would 
give us smaller communication networks among the people. Also urbanization rate 
gives us clues about the conservative tendencies of community since the right-left 
divide in Turkey has for long mimicked the center (elite, secular, educated)-periphery 
(conservative, religious, uneducated) divide (Çarkoğlu & Hinich, 2006). 
The economic voting literature incorporates the inflation and unemployment rate 
data for controlling for those economic factors that are expected to have an impact on 
voting decision (Lewis-Beck & Paldam, 2000; Wlezien, 2005); however, I do not have 
province level data on inflation and unemployment rate for the years of 1991, 1995 and 
1999. To estimate the impact of economic factors I incorporate the GDP per capita data 
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for years 1991, 1995 and 1999. Also my “doctor per hospital bed” indicator will help to 
control for the economic development level of the province.  
Population growth rate is included to control for migration flows to the province. 
Migration is a macro-level socio-economic indicator and it is used to measure the 
inclination of voters towards populist radical right and religious fundamentalist parties 
whose ideologies are based on exclusionism and xenophobia (Hirsch-Hoefler, Canetti & 
Pedahzur, 2010). The populations with low income and education level afraid of 
competition in the labor market that results from migration inflow.   
Under a more detailed model (MODEL 2) I also look at the impact of 
unemployment, agricultural sector share and household size on parties‟ vote share. 
These new variables can give a more detailed picture of those economic factors that 
people take into account while voting. Unfortunately, only the years of 1990 and 2000 
data is available, so I incorporate the 1990 indicators  for 1995 elections, and 2000 
indicators for 1999 elections. 
I also present the results under a limited model (MODEL 3) by aggregating the 
selective and indiscriminate victimization incidents to demonstrate the relationship 
between the total victimization and the vote share of government, left-right, and 
hardliner parties.  
I use a tobit regression model- also called censored regression model- because it 
helps to analyze the limited dependent variables which have a below and above cut 
level (Wooldridge, 2005, pg. 600). Our dependent variable, the vote share of the 
political parties varies between 0 and 100. I have a panel data on three different time 
period (1991, 1995, and 1999) and I treat the unobserved factors as random effect on 
the province level and analyze the data on the civilian victimization that is clustered on 
the province level for the elections of 1991, 1995 and 1999.  
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4.2 Data  
4.2.1 Data on Human Rights Violations  
I incorporate a unique data set that I constructed by aggregating the human rights 
violations in Turkey between 1990 and 2000 that is related to the Kurdish conflict. The 
data set spans the first period of conflict which is between the beginning of the conflict 
and the end of the first period with the capture of Öcalan, the leader of the PKK. After 
Öcalan‟s capture, the PKK ceased its activities until 2004. Also the 1990s is the decade 
of the severest human rights violations by the PKK and the state. Beside the capture of 
Öcalan, by the end of 1999, relationship between Turkey and European Union made 
progress and Turkey tried to show good will to proceed negotiations by abolishing 
death penalty and restoring its image by decreasing the level of human rights violations.  
The data set records the date (day, month and year), location (province and 
county), group (state or PKK) that conducted the violation, the description of human 
rights violation and number of people killed or wounded. Moreover, I classify the 
incidents into two broad types of violence: indiscriminate and selective. However, for 
the analysis I can incorporate only date and location (on province level), group that 
conducted violation, and the types of selective or indiscriminate. Unfortunately, I 
cannot analyze the data in county level because of the lack of enough data on county 
level. Also the numbers of killed and wounded are not very reliable since I do not have 
a consistent and continuous reports on a specific incidents that allows me to track losses 
of life for those are wounded.  
The type of the civilian victimization comes from the Kalyvas‟ definition of 
indiscriminate and selective targeting and killing. Kalyvas defines selective violence as 
violence which entails individualized targeting, whereas he argues that indiscriminate 
violence implies the random killing or harming the people without prior selection of the 
victims (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 420). For example, arrest, beating, threatening, kidnapping, 
torture and ill-treatment after an identity check are coded as selective victimization 
since I know that the perpetrator knows the identity of victim. In the Turkish case it can 
be a doctor who was abducted by the PKK, or a community leader who was killed or 
tortured by the state because of attending insurgent meetings, are coded as selective 
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violence. I coded those cases about which I could not be sure whether the perpetrator 
had known the identity of the victim or not, as indiscriminate. Also arbitrary arrest, 
forced deportation, curfew, evacuation of villages, suicide bombings, aerial and artillery 
bombings are coded as indiscriminate victimization. 
The dataset is built upon the annual reports of TĠHV (Human Rights Foundation 
of Turkey). TĠHV is a non-governmental organization that aims to document and 
prevent torture and ill-treatment. Besides reports on torture and ill-treatment TĠVH also 
prepares reports and publications on human rights and freedoms violations. Within 
these reports I use annual reports for the years 1993-2000 and daily human rights 
reports for 1990-1992. The incidents I record and code are the incidents that are related 
with the Kurdish conflict.  
Instead of „human rights violations,‟ I used the term „civilian victimization‟ which 
embraces the direct (selective) and indirect (indiscriminate) targeting or killing the 
civilians. Civilian victimization is the targeting and killing (attempt to kill) of 
noncombatants during the war that includes aerial, naval, and artillery bombardment; 
sieges, naval blockades, and economic sanctions that deprive noncombatants of food; 
massacres, and forced movements and concentrations of people. Civilian victimization 
not only includes the direct deaths but also the indirect ones that result from the 
intentional confiscation, destruction, or blockade of necessities of life (Downes, 2006, 
pg. 156). The term is mainly constructed for international warfare in the Geneva 
Conventions, but I apply the term for intra-state conflict. The term is problematic on the 
side of the unintentional killings because “collateral damage” is excluded from the 
definition. Nonetheless, I also count in the collateral damage in my dataset. Therefore 
the term civilian victimization refers to human rights violations that also include 
collateral damage that violates the right to life.  
According to the Geneva Convention the combatants “consist of all organized 
armed forces, groups and units that are under a command responsible for the conduct of 
its subordinates,” and everyone else is a noncombatant. I only counted the victimization 
of the non-combatants either by the state or the PKK. However, within these non-
combatants I also exclude the incidents in which the deputies were involved. For 
example, the forced arrest of Kurdish DEP parliamentarians in 1994, violent police 
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interventions to the protests (as a result of which the deputies get hurt) and ill-treatment 
towards these politicians are excluded from the data. These deputies and party delegates 
mainly get hurt away from the province they live in or represent; therefore I cannot 
track the impact of the incident on voters at the province level. Mainly, the protests and 
the following ill-treatments occurred in the capital province. However I counted the 
local representatives of political parties. For example, I counted in the incidents in 
which village headmen were involved. Also incidents of torture and ill-treatment in 
prison are excluded because prisoners are kept in different provinces from their home 
towns, so the effect of the violations in the prisons is hard to track since I do not have 
the information of the hometown of the prisoners. Moreover, for most of the violations 
in the prisons, there is no clear information about whether it is related with Kurdish 
conflict or not. 
Civilian victimization can be perpetrated by the state and the PKK. The state has 
multiple armed forces like gendarme, police, village guard, special operations 
department, etc. I accumulated these different parties under the name of state. On the 
PKK side the perpetrator does not change since PKK does not have different 
organization branches like state forces. 
The incidents I coded is a cumulative work for torture, arrest, ill-treatment, aerial 
and artillery bombing, beating, threatening, lost under custody, evacuation of villages, 
forced deportation, curfew, kidnapping, extrajudicial execution, loss of property by 
setting fire or destroying, suicide bombing. I exclude the un-identified killings and 
deaths resulted by land mines from the dataset. With the same reason I exclude 
incidents in which the perpetrator‟s ID is not clear from the data. In some cases there is 
no solid evidence about the identity of the perpetrator. For these cases against the vague 
and contradictory official statements I refer to the local sources and statements and code 
in line with the local reports. If people believe that an execution is carried out by the 
PKK (even if they were wearing military dresses), I coded the event perpetrated by the 
PKK but if local sources are not clear or ambivalent excluded the event. I followed this 
strategy because I tried to measure the impact of the event on the people‟s opinions; 
therefore, I argue that people should decide according to what they believe in.   
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TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics: Civilian Victimization by State on Province Level 
 Observations Mean at 
Province 
Level 
Std. 
Dev. at 
Province 
Level 
Min at 
Province 
Level 
Max at 
Province 
Level 
Total Victimization 1421 6.0987 17.1367 0 146 
Selective Victimization 464 1.9914 6.5561 0 62 
Indiscriminate 
Victimization 
957 4.1072 11.1115 0 84 
Total Victimization in 
Emergency State Prov. 
1016 27.4594 33.9113 0 146 
Selective Victimization in 
Emergency State Prov. 
323 8.7297 14.0488 0 62 
Indiscriminate 
Victimization in 
Emergency State Prov. 
693 18.7297 21.1314 0 84 
 
TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics: Civilian Victimization by the PKK on Province 
Level 
 Observations Mean at 
Province 
Level 
Std. 
Dev. at 
Province 
Level 
Min at 
Province 
Level 
Max at 
Province 
Level 
Total Victimization 811 3.4806 9.3523 0 86 
Selective Victimization 427 1.8326 5.3484 0 41 
Indiscriminate 
Victimization 
384 1.6480 4.5774 0 45 
Total Victimization in 
Emergency State Prov. 
485 13.1081 16.9341 0 86 
Selective Victimization in 
Emergency State Prov. 
227 6.1351 9.6929 0 41 
Indiscriminate 
Victimization in Emergency 
State Prov. 
258 6.9729 8.2848 0 45 
 
 
The provinces under state of emergency are Adıyaman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, 
Elazığ, Hakkari, Mardin, MuĢ, Siirt, Tunceli, Van, Batman and ġırnak.  
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To test Kydd and Walter‟s hypothesis that attacks by combatants on civilians are 
strategic and conscious actions to form an impact on the people I also analyzed whether 
the number of incidents and their intensity is associated with the timing of elections. 
(2002). The main argument here is that the combatant sides are conscious in their 
actions and act strategic about the results and impact their actions have on people. Table 
3 displays the number of civilian victimization by the State and the PKK according to 
time distance to the elections. I accumulate the data for each election, for example 
Selective Victimization 1 year before the elections indicates the number of civilian 
victimization incidents during the years of 1990, 1994 and 1998.  
 
TABLE 3: Descriptive Statistics: The Distance between Elections and Number of 
Victimization 
 STATE PKK 
Selective Victimization 1 year before the elections 232 147 
Selective Victimization 2 years before the elections 123 192 
Selective Victimization 3 years before the elections 100 84 
Selective Victimization 4 years before the elections 9 4 
Indiscriminate Victimization 1 year before the elections 446 194 
Indiscriminate Victimization 2 years before the elections 246 101 
Indiscriminate Victimization 3 years before the elections 244 81 
Indiscriminate Victimization 4 years before the elections 21 8 
 
 
As we can see from the descriptive statics, both the PKK and the state increase their 
activities as elections get closer. We can conclude that the victimization during the civil 
conflict in Turkey is conscious and strategic.  
4.2.2 Data on Elections  
Data on general election results is received from the Turkish Institute of Statistics. I 
incorporate the vote share of parties in the three consecutive parliamentary elections on 
20 October 1991, 24 December 1995 and 18 April 1999 at the province level. I leave 
out the previous and subsequent elections since the civilian victimization data cover the 
time period between 1990 and 2000.  
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Party positions and vote share (%) are shown in Table 5. The Islamic RP later FP 
is evaluated under the right wing parties because of its position on religious 
conservatism. As we see in the Table 5 the average vote share of RP/FP is higher in the 
Kurdish populated areas than in overall Turkey for all the three elections.  The MHP is 
also analyzed under the right wing parties because of its position on national and 
religious ideology. The HADEP is considered as left wing party; however this party 
also constructs its policies solely on the Kurdish cultural and social rights. In this 
respect I label this party as ethnic party (Chandra, 2011), but I evaluate this party under 
the left wing parties.  
The analysis of government party vote share is difficult since during the 90s 
Turkey has a series of coalition governments. There were eight governments between 
20 October 1991 and 18 April 1999 elections and six of them were coalition 
governments which are shown in Table 4.  
TABLE 4: Descriptive Statistics: Governments of Turkey between 1991 and 1999 
elections 
Government Leading Party Coalition Partners Time of Duty 
49
th
 Government DYP SHP 20.11.1991-16.05.1993 
50
th
 Government DYP SHP 25.06.1993-05.10.1995 
51
st
 Government DYP - 05.10.1995-30.10.1995 
52
nd
 Government DYP CHP 30.10.1995-06.03.1996 
53
rd
 Government ANAP DYP 06.03.1996-28.06.1996 
54
th
 Government RP DYP 28.06.1996-30.06.1997 
55
th
 Government ANAP DSP, DTP 30.06.1997-11.01.1999 
56
th
 Government DSP - 11.01.1999-28.05.1999 
4.2.3 Data on Socio Economic and Demographic Indicators  
The sources of population size, population growth rate, urbanization rate, GDP per 
capita, and doctor per hospital bed, and additional data of unemployment, agriculture 
sector share and household size is the Turkish Institute of Statistics (TUIK). Population 
size, population growth rate, urbanization rate, GDP per capita, and doctor per hospital 
bed data is available on yearly basis and I analyze the data of years 1991, 1995 and 
1999 for each election time. For unemployment, agricultural sector share and household 
size only 1990 and 2000 years are available. By using these data for the 1991 and 1999 
elections I will provide a richer analysis. 
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TABLE 5: Descriptive Statistics: The Vote Share (%) of Parties in 1991, 1995 and 1999 Elections 
 1991 Elections 
(Turkey) 
1991 Elec. (State of 
Emergency) 
1995 Elections 
(Turkey) 
1995 Elec. (State of 
Emergency) 
1999 Elections 
(Turkey) 
1999 Elec. (State of 
Emergency) 
ANAP (center-
right) 24.01 19.67 19.65 15.97 13.22 11.57 
DYP (center-
right) 27.03 21.58 19.18 14.50 12.01 13.19 
DSP (center-
left) 10.75 1.89 14.64 2.32 22.19 5.20 
SHP/CHP 
(center-left) 20.75 36.54 10.71 4.93 8.71 4.47 
RP/FP (Pro-
Islamic) 16.77 18.99 21.38 24.11 15.41 15.99 
HADEP 
(Kurdish) - - 4.17 27.24 4.75 29.44 
MHP (ultra-
nationalist) - - 8.18 4.84 17.98 5.99 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
5.1 Effect of Civilian Victimization on Government’s Vote Share  
Table 6 (Model 1) shows the estimated association of indiscriminate and selective 
victimization with government party‟s vote share. I construct my hypotheses on the idea 
that indiscriminate victimization is counterproductive and selective victimization is 
productive, but the estimated associations with both state indiscriminate and selective 
victimization assume the opposite direction. State indiscriminate victimization is 
associated positively with government vote share in the proceeding election. Moreover, 
state selective victimization is negatively associated with government vote share. These 
results do not support my hypotheses. One possible explanation may be in line of 
Lyall‟s findings on Chechen-Russian civil war. Lyall argues (2009) that Russian 
artillery fire in Chechnya totally demolished the insurgency communication and human 
network; therefore, indiscriminate violence in Chechnya was productive for Russia. If 
state violence is extensive enough to leave no room for people other than supporting 
existing ruler, people may vote for the government.  
I argue that selective victimization is productive as a counter-insurgency strategy 
and expect state selective victimization to have a positive association with government 
vote share. However, this hypothesis is not supported by the findings. The literature is 
also contains contradictory findings on selective victimization. For example, Sullivian 
finds that torture does not work as a counter insurgency strategy (2014), but targeted 
killings of Israel does help in halting Palestinian attacks (Jaeger & Paserman, 2009). My 
dataset aggregates incidents of torture and targeted killings under selective 
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victimization. One alternative approach might be to conduct similar analyses with a 
more detailed typology of victimizations.  
My initial expectation about the association between PKK victimizations and 
government vote share is supported by the findings. In the 3
rd
 Model (see Table 12 in 
Appendix) we see that both state and PKK victimization are negatively associated with 
government vote share. The results are in line with the assumptions that civilian 
victimization leads to resentment against the government that harms civilians itself or is 
unable to protect the civilians against insurgency violence. Therefore, people retrieve 
their support from the governing parties.  
The results do not change significantly when I evaluate the DSP separately from 
the other governing parties; therefore, I include the DSP into governing parties and 
proceed to interpret the results as such.  
The estimated coefficients for GDP per capita and urbanization rate are 
significant. When I add the detailed variables about the socio-economic factors (see 
Model 2-Table 9 in Appendix), the direction of the impact of GDP per capita changes 
from positive to negative. Urbanization rate is negatively associated with government 
parties‟ vote share which means the more urbanized the province the lesser the approval 
rate of government in the province during 1990s. Also household size and agriculture 
share of employment are negatively associated with government vote share. These 
results suggest that as household size gets larger and agricultural share of employment 
grows in a province, the rate of approval of government is dropping among the people. 
The provinces that have large household size and larger agricultural share are generally 
the rural areas. This outcome contradicts with the previous founding of the urbanization 
rate‟s negative impact on the government vote share, or I can say that the development 
scores and the economic development rates of the provinces influence the voting 
behavior of the Turkish people. 
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TABLE 6 (MODEL 1): The Impact of Indiscriminate and Selective Victimization 
on Government Party Vote Share 
 STATE PKK 
 Gov 
Parties 
Gov Parties 
w/o DSP 
Gov 
Parties 
Gov Parties 
w/o DSP 
     
Indiscriminate Victimization 0.389*** 0.313*** -0.276 -0.191 
 (3.40) (2.90) (-1.39) (-0.97) 
Selective Victimization -0.952*** -0.836*** -0.665*** -0.560*** 
 (-5.84) (-5.44) (-4.35) (-3.73) 
Doctor per hospital bed 4.857 5.925** 4.035 5.274* 
 (1.58) (2.05) (1.39) (1.85) 
GDP per Capita 2.055* 0.296 1.056 -0.500 
 (1.84) (0.28) (1.00) (-0.48) 
Population 0.0124* 0.0109* 0.0183*** 0.0144** 
 (1.78) (1.66) (2.82) (2.25) 
Population Growth 6.423 5.311 6.730 5.480 
 (1.08) (0.94) (1.19) (0.99) 
Urbanization Rate -0.112* -0.118* -0.0933 -0.105* 
 (-1.68) (-1.87) (-1.48) (-1.71) 
Emergency State -3.701 -3.067 1.795 0.480 
 (-1.42) (-1.25) (0.82) (0.22) 
Constant -16.10*** -16.84*** -14.83*** -15.65*** 
 (-5.09) (-5.65) (-4.97) (-5.34) 
     
sigma_u     
Constant 1.27e-17 3.67e-18 3.20e-16 7.20e-17 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
     
sigma_e     
Constant 7.541*** 7.110*** 7.112*** 6.986*** 
 (17.49) (17.49) (17.49) (17.49) 
     
R-squared     
Number of Cases 153 153 153 153 
     
*p<0.10,**p<0.05,***0.01 
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5.2 Effect of Civilian Victimization on Right and Left-Wing Parties’ Vote Share  
The Table 7 (Model 1) shows the predicted association between indiscriminate and 
selective victimization and the right and left wing parties‟ vote share. The first 
hypothesis, on the state indiscriminate victimization and its positive association with 
left wing and negative association with right wing parties, is supported by the findings. 
However, the second hypothesis that people vote for more concessionist right wing 
parties when they are exposed to insurgency violence is not supported. When I 
aggregate the selective and indiscriminate victimization incidents (see Table 13- Model 
3 in Appendix) the direction of the association between PKK violence and vote share of 
the parties support my hypothesis. As we add detailed economic coefficients 
(unemployment, household size and agricultural share in employment) to our model the 
significance of the impact of PKK victimization –both indiscriminate and selective- and 
the selective victimization of the state disappear (see Table 10 in Appendix).  
I do not expect selective victimization yields different findings than 
indiscriminate victimization; however, the results indicate that selective victimization of 
both combatant sides is positively associated with the right wing parties vote share, 
while it is negatively associated with the left wing parties‟ vote share. These results 
suggest that people, who are exposed to violence, are voting for the right wing parties 
those will increase intensity of the fighting. Thus, the number of victimizations is 
expected to increase. In order to control the impact of parties those specifically own the 
Kurdish issue and those are controversial on their ideological positions on the right and 
left divide, I construct another model by evaluating these parties separately from the rest 
of the right or left wing parties (see Table 15 in Appendix). However, the results do not 
change significantly.   
Among the socio-economic indicators, doctor per hospital bed and GDP per 
capita are positively associated with the vote share of left wing parties; while the 
association turns negative with the vote share of the right wing parties. Urbanization 
rate is negatively associated with both parties vote share. However when I add 
unemployment rate, household size and agriculture share in the model doctor per 
hospital bed and GDP per capita variables lose their explanatory power, and the 
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association between urbanization rate and right wing parties‟ vote share turn from 
negative to positive (see the Table 10-Model 2, in Appendix). As the unemployment 
rate increases right wing parties lose vote while left wing parties gain.   
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TABLE 7 (MODEL 1): The Impact of Indiscriminate and Selective Victimization 
on Right and Left Wing Party Vote Share 
 STATE PKK 
 LEFT RIGHT LEFT RIGHT 
     
Indiscriminate Victimization 0.236** -0.406*** 0.508*** -0.258 
 (2.52) (-3.53) (3.09) (-1.24) 
Selective Victimization -0.366*** 0.458*** -0.527*** 0.406** 
 (-2.66) (2.70) (-4.25) (2.54) 
Doctor per hospital bed 7.837*** -9.155*** 6.486** -8.128** 
 (2.90) (-2.88) (2.45) (-2.51) 
GDP per Capita 3.414** -2.519 2.555 -1.009 
 (2.12) (-1.44) (1.58) (-0.54) 
Population 0.0208** -0.00243 0.0198* -0.00415 
 (2.02) (-0.22) (1.91) (-0.35) 
Population Growth 1.629 2.389 1.348 2.368 
 (0.31) (0.36) (0.26) (0.37) 
Urbanization Rate -0.115 -0.0748 -0.0495 -0.201** 
 (-1.38) (-0.79) (-0.61) (-2.02) 
Emergency State 7.778*** -5.837* 7.511*** -7.043** 
 (2.82) (-1.84) (2.74) (-2.06) 
Constant 24.11*** 79.85*** 23.15*** 82.92*** 
 (6.43) (19.31) (6.24) (19.18) 
     
sigma_u     
Constant 8.415*** 8.416*** 8.902*** 9.426*** 
 (10.46) (9.29) (10.88) (9.38) 
     
sigma_e     
Constant 5.589*** 6.992*** 5.301*** 6.789*** 
 (16.98) (16.68) (17.06) (16.28) 
     
R-squared     
Number of Cases 229 229 229 229 
     
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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5.3 Effect of Civilian Victimization on HADEP and MHP’s Vote Share  
Table 8 (Model 1) shows the impact of indiscriminate and selective victimization on 
HADEP and MHP‟s vote share. State indiscriminate victimization and its positive 
impact on HADEP‟s vote share supports my hypothesis that people polarize around 
their ethnic identity (Kıbrıs, 2014), and that they also punish the perpetrator side. 
However my second hypothesis which claims that PKK indiscriminate victimization 
decreases HADEP‟s votes is not suggested by the results. People do not punish 
HADEP, which is associated with the PKK, in response to their losses. One possible 
explanation, as in the case of Afghanistan (Lyall, Blair & Imai, 2013) is that  the ethnic 
loyalties are not flexible or people are less eager to punish a perpetrator whom they find 
close in terms of ethnicity, nation, and religion to the community. PKK selective 
victimization is expected to be positively associated with the vote share of HADEP, but 
the predicted coefficient turns out to be negative. I do not find any significant impact of 
either state or PKK victimization on the MHP‟s vote share. Aggregating the 
indiscriminate and selective victimization cases does not influence the findings (see 
Table 14-Model 3 in Appendix).  
In terms of socioeconomic indicators, doctor per hospital bed is positively 
associated with the vote share of HADEP, but GDP per capita is negatively correlated 
with both parties‟ vote share, while the unemployment rate is correlated positively. 
When I add more detailed economic indicators the impact of GDP per capita on 
HADEP‟s vote share is diminished, but for the MHP it is still explanatory. Therefore I 
can say that MHP increases its vote share as the province‟s level of GDP per capita 
decreases and the unemployment rate increases. Household size correlated differently 
with these two parties‟ vote shares. As the household size gets larger HADEP‟s vote 
share increases and MHP‟s vote share decreases. Agricultural share of employment is 
positively associated with the vote share of MHP.  
The emergency state status is another variable that is highly explanatory for the 
two parties‟ vote share. People living under the emergency status are more likely to vote 
for HADEP and disapprove the MHP. We know the provinces that are on the 
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emergency state status generally populated by the ethnic Kurds. Thus, this disapproval 
of MHP makes sense, since the party does not recognize the Kurdish ethnicity. 
TABLE 8 (MODEL 1): The Impact of Indiscriminate and Selective Victimization 
on HADEP and MHP Vote Share 
 STATE PKK 
 HADEP MHP HADEP MHP 
     
Indiscriminate Victimization 0.207*** -0.0375 0.240** -0.0189 
 (3.26) (-0.32) (2.00) (-0.09) 
Selective Victimization 0.0110 -0.0459 -0.198** -0.173 
 (0.12) (-0.28) (-2.28) (-1.07) 
Doctor per hospital bed 6.434*** 1.620 3.805 1.558 
 (2.59) (0.54) (1.41) (0.52) 
GDP per Capita -3.285*** -2.540** -3.806*** -2.735** 
 (-3.12) (-2.28) (-3.27) (-2.45) 
Population -0.00766 -0.0137* -0.000483 -0.0136** 
 (-1.10) (-1.94) (-0.06) (-1.96) 
Population Growth 0.677 -7.064 0.573 -6.898 
 (0.21) (-1.16) (0.19) (-1.14) 
Urbanization Rate 0.0997 0.161** 0.109 0.162** 
 (1.49) (2.44) (1.46) (2.47) 
Emergency State 10.99*** -11.77*** 12.47*** -11.86*** 
 (5.35) (-4.49) (5.33) (-5.11) 
Constant -0.185 11.33*** 1.909 11.75*** 
 (-0.06) (3.59) (0.54) (3.74) 
     
sigma_u     
Constant 5.404*** 8.17e-17 6.484*** 1.20e-17 
 (9.32) (0.00) (9.37) (0.00) 
     
sigma_e     
Constant 3.097*** 7.675*** 2.859*** 7.631*** 
 (11.01) (17.66) (10.31) (17.66) 
     
R-squared     
Number of Cases 156 156 156 156 
     
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
Killing civilians is believed to be a counter-productive tactic during a civil war, since it 
creates resentment against the combatant side and people punish the perpetrator by 
withholding their human and logistic support. The level of punishment depends on the 
identities of the combatant sides and local people who are exposed to violence. If there 
is ideological or identity affiliation between civilians and combatant side, people tend to 
be less eager to punish the perpetrator. Weinstein argues that groups which are 
internally undisciplined are more willing to commit crime. If we ignore the existence of 
this factor, we know that selective and indiscriminate violence is conscious and 
strategically crucial for providing advantage during the war. Indiscriminate violence is 
an easier form of harming civilians because it does not need any information network or 
planning under an organizational structure. For example, dropping a bomb, or strafing 
people and houses is a less risky and cheaper way to fight. However, indiscriminate 
targeting is not as effective as selective targeting to efficiently suppress the power of the 
rival. Here we care about the results of these targeting cases to win the support of 
people and we can measure the political results of these targetings with the electoral 
choices.   
Interestingly the indiscriminate victimizations of the state increase the rate of 
approval for government, but the selective victimization backfires and decreases the 
government party vote share. These results do not fit with my expectations, but why? 
The indiscriminate victimization cases may be resulted with a total demolishment of the 
local people that they have no other choice to support the government party. The total 
victimization cases do support my hypothesis about the state and the PKK perpetrated 
victimization‟s effect.  
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In line with my expectations, PKK violence influences left wing parties positively 
and right wing parties negatively. However, total state victimization cases does not give 
us significant results, so I conclude that state perpetrated violence has no impact on the 
left-right party divide. Both combatant selective targeting actions make people to vote 
for the right wing parties and withdraw their support form left parties. According to 
these results exposure to selective victimization is associated with an increase in the 
vote share of hardliner rightist parties who are more likely to intensify the conflict 
further. This result does not seem to be realistic, so I stick with the model of total 
victimization and vote share or right-left parties.  
The pro-Kurdish HADEP wins votes from the victimizations of both state and 
PKK. The positive association between state victimization and HADEP votes makes 
sense since we expect that communities those are exposed to violence polarized around 
their ethnic identity, and HADEP is the champion of the Kurdish population. I argue 
that the positive association between PKK victimization and the vote share of HADEP 
can be only the result of proximity of ethnic identity between PKK and people who are 
exposed to PKK violence. Also when I aggregate the types of victimization, total 
victimization becomes insignificant on the HADEP or MHP‟s vote share. I cannot 
gather a significant impact on the MHP‟s vote share either. One explanation might be 
that I overestimate the ideological proximity between MHP and army, or the 
geographical distribution of votes. The war and violence is concentrated in the south-
east Turkey. The vote share of MHP among the Kurdish populated regions is low in 
general. Kurdish populated regions overlap with the regions under the state of 
emergency (see Table 5: descriptive statistics). MHP gathered 4.84 percent of the south-
east provinces, while it gathered 8.18 in overall Turkey in the 1995 elections. Also in 
the 1999 elections, MHP‟s vote share was 5.99 percent in the south-east region, while 
the party got 17.98% of the overall votes.  
Throughout the analysis I demonstrate that there is a relationship between civilian 
victimization and the voting decisions of Turkish people empirically. However, we 
should look closer to the Turkish case and victimization incidents in order to understand 
the mechanism behind of these empirical results.  
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   “Everywhere became a target… What we have done? What was our sin? 
These are done since we were Kurds. The same think was done in 1992 
Newroz. 40 dead, 120 wounded…We, Kurdish people, were „terrorists‟ as a 
whole. It was our title. We were attacked…Killed, burned, and 
impoverished. „Terrorists‟ were us too. Yet they were…innocent…” (Çiçek, 
BĠA, 2013).  
 
The statement above belongs to a witness that lived in ġırnak during 18 August 
1992 raid. The government claimed it is done by PKK, but PKK refused. The witnesses 
and victims state the raid was done by Turkish army forces. This incident and victim 
testimony indicates that people are believed they are targeted because of their Kurdish 
identity. According to a survey that is conducted in 2008 (Ergil, 2010) the 62 percent of 
people who live in East and South-East provinces in where DTP (successor of HADEP 
before BDP) has leverage think Turkish nationalism increasing. The 50 percent of 
people who live in East and South-East provinces in where DTP is not strong think the 
same, like 40 percent of people who live in West provinces. The same question is asked 
for trend in Kurdish nationalism. Moreover, more people think that Kurdish nationalism 
is increasing as we moved from East to West provinces. Here we can observe the people 
are polarizing around their ethnic identities. At the same time they think opponent 
restructure its identity around the ethnic identity in Turkey (Ergil, 2010).   
 Avsiya says “My cousins…young people, they are all with the guerilla now. 
They revolted. This place was nothing but hell. If they would stay, they would be killed 
anyway.” She lived in Çukurca county of Hakkari province during the 1990s. Her 
words clearly indicate that state violence is not justified in the eyes of locals and people 
become targets no matter of their actions are (Akın & DanıĢman, 2011, pg. 85). The 
statements of victims suggest that people find a shelter in PKK and opportunity to take 
revenge of their losses from state. Ergil utters a detailed map of road that lies from 
civilian life to guerilla membership.  
   “Another humanitarian plight is happening among the young people who 
studied in the college and returned to their villages. They cannot find a job 
that fits to their quality. This follows an investigation by the security forces 
since they are lingering around without job. This ends up to a lawsuit in 
State Security Courts. Finally, they are acquitted since there is no guilt 
exists. However, this distressed times shake deeply these young people. 
They are alienated from the society and political system…These people do 
not feel safe. As an opinion leader says „These people cry one more year, 
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and then they go to the „month.‟ Unfortunately, they do so…” (Ergil, 2010, 
pg. 134).  
 
ġeyhan is a man who lived in a village in Lice during his early youth, after the 
death of his father he was forced to move to Adana. He states that state forces forced the 
civilians to take side between the state and PKK. He tells the behavior of PKK members 
just after a state raid to his village.  
   “It was 1994 or 1995…I guess an armed fight took place in our village, it 
was the first time I saw guerilla and the thing they meant to me was rescue. 
They were going to save us, I understood that. They took care of us and 
talked to us…they were not like soldiers…” (Akın & DanıĢman, 2011, pg. 
196).  
 
Another opinion leader explains the reasons of the rebellion and armed activism 
in the South-East of Turkey by displaying the situation of civilians who get jammed 
between state and PKK, and “we cannot tell the truth. Because both of them-state and 
PKK- are sided with absolute authority, and distant from real democracy. Instead of 
winning the people, they want to dominate and rule the people. If you are a sheep, it is 
not important who the herder is” (Ergil, 2010, pg.129).  
We can observe social and political impacts of a recent incident, Uludere 
(Roboski) massacre. On December 28, 2011 34 civilians were killed in the consequence 
of aerial bombardment by they were passing the border from Iraq to Turkey. All of the 
killed people were ethnically Kurdish. The incident is named as extrajudicial execution 
and mass murder by the human rights inspectors. In the following month people are 
asked “what happened in the last month that made you angry most?” in the KONDA 
Barometer -monthly political and social surveys by a Turkish public opinion research 
and consultancy company KONDA. The answers suggest that Kurdish people who are 
voting for the BDP (successor of HADEP) are highly sensitive and angry because of the 
Uludere massacre. The 55 percent of these people states an incident that is related to 
national agenda, not the personal issues. Moreover the 90 percent of these national 
issues were Uludere massacre. However, only the 10 percent of Kurdish people who 
supports AKP (government party at that period and successor of RP/FP) states an 
incident that is related to national agenda (Ağırdır, 2012). Here we can conclude that 
civilian victimization cases are important only depending on the political position of the 
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people. The vote share of government party AKP decreases from 20.6 percent in 2011 
June elections to 8.8 percent in 2015 elections in ġırnak province, and decreases from 
18.4 percent to 6.12 percent in Uludere county. We cannot conclude these results are 
only because of Uludere incident. There are multiple economic and social factors that is 
resulted with the decline of government party on the national level. 
For the future studies first of all one can enlarge and detail the types of the 
victimization, for example torture, extra-judicial execution, ill-treatment, bombing, 
missing cases etc. This approach will give more accurate results. Secondly, future 
studies can analyze the impact of one more political cleavage on the existing research 
by adding religion factor. The fight between the state and the PKK is significant on the 
nationalist cleavage but one can also observe the religious and secular divide among the 
Kurds with the fight between the Hizbullah and the PKK. Religion is a critical factor 
that differentiates and polarizes the Kurds. Finally, we can also investigate the spillover 
effects of individual cases by measuring the political party preference of neighboring 
provinces/county/village/hamlet. Our analysis only measures the impact of an incident 
in that province. By measuring spillover effect we can acquire a national level or 
regional level results of civilian victimization incidents. The existing research is 
degrading the idiosyncratic impacts and features of 2232 incidents into same level. 
Moreover, we are aware of that some incidents have bigger impact on the public 
conscious by appearing in the news extensively, but some of them never have a place on 
the news. For this reason, in this future research we should control media effect by 
looking the existence of incidents on the media; if it is existed we should look whether 
it is uttered in positive or negative manner.    
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APPENDIX 
TABLE 9 (MODEL 2): The Impact of Indiscriminate and Selective Victimization 
on Government Party Vote Share 
 STATE PKK 
 Gov 
Parties 
Gov Parties 
w/o DSP 
Gov 
Parties 
Gov Parties 
w/o DSP 
     
Indiscriminate Victimization 0.359*** 0.289*** -0.244 -0.186 
 (3.69) (2.78) (-1.36) (-0.97) 
Selective Victimization -0.864*** -0.765*** -0.491*** -0.496*** 
 (-6.15) (-5.08) (-3.49) (-3.31) 
Doctor per hospital bed 5.105* 5.007* 3.856 3.843 
 (1.90) (1.74) (1.43) (1.34) 
GDP per Capita -3.367** -2.123 -3.501*** -2.223 
 (-2.54) (-1.49) (-2.64) (-1.58) 
Population 0.00452 0.00407 0.00827 0.00680 
 (0.70) (0.59) (1.30) (1.01) 
Population Growth 10.01** 7.430 9.644* 7.088 
 (1.96) (1.36) (1.89) (1.31) 
Urbanization Rate -0.497*** -0.348*** -0.434*** -0.287*** 
 (-5.95) (-3.88) (-5.07) (-3.16) 
Emergency State 0.0490 -2.832 3.362 -0.426 
 (0.02) (-1.03) (1.40) (-0.17) 
Unemployment 1.039*** 0.376 0.624*** -0.0208 
 (4.71) (1.59) (2.79) (-0.09) 
Household Size -3.405*** -0.517 -2.319** 0.499 
 (-3.81) (-0.54) (-2.56) (0.52) 
Agriculture Share -38.68*** -29.57*** -39.84*** -30.37*** 
 (-4.09) (-2.92) (-4.22) (-3.03) 
Constant 45.62*** 17.60 41.49*** 13.56 
 (4.45) (1.60) (4.00) (1.23) 
     
sigma_u     
Constant 3.58e-17 8.72e-18 7.41e-17 4.28e-19 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
     
sigma_e     
Constant 6.390*** 6.843*** 6.405*** 6.802*** 
 (17.44) (17.44) (17.44) (17.44) 
     
R-squared     
 54 
Number of Cases 152 152 152 152 
     
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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TABLE 10 (MODEL 2): The Impact of Indiscriminate and Selective Victimization 
on Right and Left Wing Party Vote Share 
 STATE PKK 
 LEFT RIGHT LEFT RIGHT 
     
Indiscriminate Victimization 0.191** -0.309*** 0.134 -0.0474 
 (2.50) (-2.83) (0.89) (-0.22) 
Selective Victimization -0.0527 0.145 -0.0581 -0.0272 
 (-0.47) (0.91) (-0.49) (-0.16) 
Doctor per hospital bed 4.883 -4.839 3.974 -4.794 
 (1.41) (-1.14) (1.12) (-1.09) 
GDP per Capita 2.028 1.669 2.269 1.355 
 (1.02) (0.74) (1.11) (0.57) 
Population 0.00509 0.0106 0.0149 0.00117 
 (0.46) (0.90) (1.32) (0.10) 
Population Growth 1.265 -1.716 1.549 -2.247 
 (0.33) (-0.31) (0.41) (-0.40) 
Urbanization Rate -0.186 0.432*** -0.158 0.404*** 
 (-1.44) (3.05) (-1.16) (2.62) 
Emergency State 5.824** -6.374 7.087** -9.072** 
 (2.01) (-1.56) (2.43) (-2.07) 
Unemployment 0.923*** -1.515*** 1.067*** -1.735*** 
 (4.78) (-5.64) (5.44) (-6.20) 
Household Size -1.838* 2.452* -1.860* 2.383* 
 (-1.66) (1.78) (-1.66) (1.67) 
Agriculture Share -11.93 46.53*** -2.713 38.27** 
 (-1.03) (3.17) (-0.23) (2.43) 
Constant 42.41*** 13.59 34.38** 22.48 
 (3.19) (0.84) (2.57) (1.30) 
     
sigma_u     
Constant 9.168*** 8.624*** 9.793*** 9.325*** 
 (10.59) (8.65) (10.89) (8.65) 
     
sigma_e     
Constant 3.513*** 5.373*** 3.444*** 5.333*** 
 (11.01) (10.46) (11.15) (10.13) 
     
R-squared     
Number of Cases 153 153 153 153 
     
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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TABLE 11 (MODEL 2): The Impact of Indiscriminate and Selective Victimization 
on HADEP and MHP Vote Share 
 STATE PKK 
 HADEP MHP HADEP MHP 
     
Indiscriminate Victimization 0.155*** -0.0374 0.328*** 0.0620 
 (2.78) (-0.40) (3.05) (0.35) 
Selective Victimization 0.0731 -0.0580 -0.190** 0.0938 
 (0.92) (-0.42) (-2.28) (0.64) 
Doctor per hospital bed 4.292* 4.929* 2.699 5.087* 
 (1.92) (1.68) (1.14) (1.68) 
GDP per Capita 0.470 -5.378*** 0.881 -5.861*** 
 (0.39) (-3.64) (0.69) (-3.76) 
Population -0.00919 -0.00475 -0.00109 -0.00915 
 (-1.43) (-0.64) (-0.16) (-1.21) 
Population Growth 2.719 -7.052 2.750 -7.489 
 (0.97) (-1.42) (1.02) (-1.56) 
Urbanization Rate -0.0396 0.0528 0.0143 0.00600 
 (-0.51) (0.58) (0.17) (0.06) 
Emergency State 5.799*** -3.268 7.164*** -4.163 
 (2.98) (-1.12) (3.65) (-1.42) 
Unemployment  0.645*** 1.452*** 0.753*** 1.580*** 
 (5.06) (6.82) (5.73) (6.85) 
Household Size 3.867*** -6.504*** 3.861*** -7.429*** 
 (5.37) (-5.68) (5.17) (-5.65) 
Agriculture Share -8.797 23.52** 1.781 20.61* 
 (-1.19) (2.28) (0.23) (1.96) 
Constant -15.18* 26.96** -24.80*** 35.50*** 
 (-1.87) (2.44) (-2.95) (2.99) 
     
sigma_u     
Constant 4.863*** 3.783*** 5.454*** 4.636*** 
 (9.73) (4.15) (9.88) (5.13) 
     
sigma_e     
Constant 2.647*** 5.428*** 2.526*** 4.996*** 
 (11.06) (10.33) (10.73) (9.45) 
     
R-squared     
Number of cases 153 153 153 153 
     
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
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TABLE 12 (MODEL 3): The Impact of Total Victimization on Government Party 
Vote Share 
 STATE PKK 
 Gov 
Parties 
Gov Parties wo 
DSP    
Gov 
Parties   
Gov Parties wo 
DSP    
     
Total Victimization -0.152*** -0.150*** -0.500*** -0.403*** 
 (-3.40) (-3.62) (-7.82) (-6.42) 
Doctor per hospital 
bed 
5.167 6.191** 3.901 5.148* 
 (1.56) (2.01) (1.34) (1.80) 
GDP per Capita 1.751 0.0362 1.147 -0.414 
 (1.45) (0.03) (1.08) (-0.40) 
Population 0.0156** 0.0136* 0.0195*** 0.0155** 
 (2.08) (1.95) (3.01) (2.43) 
Population Growth 5.955 4.910 6.705 5.456 
 (0.92) (0.82) (1.18) (0.98) 
Urbanization Rate -0.106 -0.113* -0.0926 -0.105* 
 (-1.48) (-1.69) (-1.47) (-1.69) 
Emergency State 0.226 0.297 2.434 1.088 
 (0.08) (0.12) (1.14) (0.52) 
Constant -16.26*** -16.98*** -15.09*** -15.89*** 
 (-4.76) (-5.34) (-5.05) (-5.42) 
     
sigma_u     
Constant 3.70e-17 2.10e-17 1.63e-17 7.76e-17 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
     
sigma_e     
Constant 8.151*** 7.588*** 7.145*** 7.016*** 
 (17.49) (17.49) (17.49) (17.49) 
     
R-squared     
Number of Cases 153 153 153 153 
     
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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TABLE 13 (MODEL 3):  The Impact of Total Victimization on Right and Left 
Wing Party Vote Share 
 STATE PKK 
 LEFT RIGHT LEFT RIGHT 
     
Total Victimization 0.00241 -0.0712 -0.0898* 0.123* 
 (0.06) (-1.44) (-1.73) (1.91) 
Doctor per hospital bed 8.007*** -9.422*** 7.875*** -8.940*** 
 (2.91) (-2.90) (2.90) (-2.76) 
GDP per Capita 3.080* -2.102 2.647 -1.097 
 (1.89) (-1.18) (1.63) (-0.60) 
Population 0.0213** -0.00319 0.0221** -0.00623 
 (2.04) (-0.28) (2.14) (-0.54) 
Population Growth 1.319 2.844 1.420 2.409 
 (0.24) (0.42) (0.26) (0.37) 
Urbanization Rate -0.0891 -0.105 -0.0637 -0.181* 
 (-1.06) (-1.08) (-0.77) (-1.84) 
Emergency State 8.490*** -6.991** 9.061*** -8.428** 
 (3.04) (-2.15) (3.29) (-2.52) 
Constant 23.21*** 80.88*** 22.73*** 82.75*** 
 (6.14) (19.20) (6.06) (19.30) 
     
sigma_u     
Constant 8.490*** 8.548*** 8.622*** 9.131*** 
 (10.42) (9.20) (10.66) (9.32) 
     
sigma_e     
Constant 5.702*** 7.170*** 5.613*** 6.955*** 
 (16.97) (16.64) (17.09) (16.40) 
     
R-squared     
Number of Cases 229 229 229 229 
     
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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TABLE 14 (MODEL 3): The Impact of Total Victimization on HADEP and MHP 
Vote Share 
 STATE PKK 
 HADEP MHP HADEP MHP 
     
Total Victimization 0.131*** -0.0409 -0.0156 -0.108 
 (3.93) (-0.97) (-0.47) (-1.60) 
Doctor per hospital 
bed 
6.559*** 1.623 4.654* 1.469 
 (2.62) (0.54) (1.74) (0.49) 
GDP per Capita -3.332*** -2.542** -3.750*** -2.692** 
 (-3.13) (-2.29) (-3.19) (-2.42) 
Population -0.00682 -0.0136* -0.00173 -0.0131* 
 (-0.97) (-1.94) (-0.22) (-1.92) 
Population Growth 0.643 -7.067 0.446 -6.910 
 (0.20) (-1.16) (0.14) (-1.14) 
Urbanization Rate 0.0964 0.161** 0.132* 0.163** 
 (1.43) (2.44) (1.75) (2.47) 
Emergency State 11.24*** -11.74*** 13.13*** -11.59*** 
 (5.42) (-4.69) (5.53) (-5.18) 
Constant -0.0436 11.33*** 0.178 11.64*** 
 (-0.01) (3.59) (0.05) (3.71) 
     
sigma_u     
Constant 5.502*** 5.47e-17 6.525*** 6.02e-18 
 (9.51) (0.00) (9.40) (0.00) 
     
sigma_e     
Constant 3.090*** 7.675*** 2.928*** 7.636*** 
 (11.14) (17.66) (10.38) (17.66) 
     
R-squared     
Number of cases 156 156 156 156 
     
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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TABLE 15: The Impact of Total Victimization on Right and Left Wing Party Vote Share (Detailed model with new left and right 
divide) 
 STATE PKK 
 LEFT w/o 
HADEP 
LEFT with  
HADEP 
RIGHT 
w/o RP/FP 
RIGHT 
with RP/FP 
LEFT w/o 
HADEP 
LEFT with 
HADEP 
RIGHT w/o 
RP/FP 
RIGHT with 
RP/FP 
         
Indiscriminate Victimization -0.309*** 0.236** -0.165* -0.406*** 0.184 0.508*** -0.296 -0.258 
 (-2.97) (2.52) (-1.68) (-3.53) (0.86) (3.09) (-1.61) (-1.24) 
Selective Victimization -0.424*** -0.366*** 0.110 0.458*** -0.698*** -0.527*** 0.102 0.406** 
 (-2.73) (-2.66) (0.74) (2.70) (-4.35) (-4.25) (0.73) (2.54) 
Doctor per hospital bed 5.153* 7.837*** -6.368** -9.155*** 5.432* 6.486** -6.050** -8.128** 
 (1.70) (2.90) (-2.47) (-2.88) (1.70) (2.45) (-2.34) (-2.51) 
GDP per Capita 7.479*** 3.414** 2.382* -2.519 7.937*** 2.555 2.587** -1.009 
 (4.18) (2.12) (1.85) (-1.44) (4.57) (1.58) (1.98) (-0.54) 
Population 0.0546*** 0.0208** -0.00921 -0.00243 0.0370*** 0.0198* -0.00927 -0.00415 
 (4.52) (2.02) (-1.13) (-0.22) (3.28) (1.91) (-1.13) (-0.35) 
Population Growth 2.804 1.629 -1.937 2.389 1.767 1.348 -1.966 2.368 
 (0.47) (0.31) (-0.34) (0.36) (0.27) (0.26) (-0.34) (0.37) 
Urbanization Rate -0.490*** -0.115 -0.128* -0.0748 -0.464*** -0.0495 -0.153** -0.201** 
 (-4.61) (-1.38) (-1.80) (-0.79) (-4.22) (-0.61) (-2.12) (-2.02) 
Emergency State 8.083*** 7.778*** -7.377*** -5.837* 3.112 7.511*** -7.678*** -7.043** 
 (2.63) (2.82) (-3.07) (-1.84) (1.05) (2.74) (-3.22) (-2.06) 
Constant 34.25*** 24.11*** 57.10*** 79.85*** 33.24*** 23.15*** 57.77*** 82.92*** 
 (7.28) (6.43) (18.30) (19.31) (7.08) (6.24) (18.43) (19.18) 
         
sigma_u         
Constant 9.382*** 8.415*** 5.429*** 8.416*** 8.256*** 8.902*** 5.605*** 9.426*** 
 (9.32) (10.46) (7.84) (9.29) (8.45) (10.88) (7.82) (9.38) 
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sigma_e         
Constant 6.271*** 5.589*** 6.233*** 6.992*** 7.028*** 5.301*** 6.179*** 6.789*** 
 (16.01) (16.98) (16.80) (16.68) (16.00) (17.06) (16.57) (16.28) 
         
R-squared         
Number of Cases 229 229 229 229 229 229 229 229 
         
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
